Tenancy by the Entireties Case Law in Florida

This page analyzes the most important Florida court decisions on tenancy by the entireties.

Bank Accounts as Entireties Property

A Florida bank account in both spouses’ names is entireties property unless a writing specifies otherwise, even if one spouse opened it alone before the other was added. Only the creditors of both spouses jointly may attach entireties property. The Florida Supreme Court (Beal Bank, 2001), the Eleventh Circuit (Sinnreich, 2004; Del Amo, 2025), and the Second District (Gibson, 2018) have applied that rule in garnishment cases and in bankruptcy.

Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates, 780 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2001). A spousal bank account whose signature card does not expressly disclaim entireties ownership is presumed to be held as a tenancy by the entireties, and the creditor then bears the burden of proving by a preponderance that it was not. The presumption requires that husband and wife established the account with the unities of possession, interest, title, and time, and with the right of survivorship. The Court extended the entireties presumption to personal property generally.

Loumpos v. Bank One, 423 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2025). Leading case. Section 655.79 authorizes a joint spousal bank account to be held as a tenancy by the entireties even if the account was originally established by one spouse. The husband had opened the account in his name and funded it with his wages before both spouses signed entireties cards, and the wife’s judgment creditor garnished it. The presumption is not defeated by an absence of the unities of time and title, and the Court quashed the Second District’s contrary decision.

Versace v. Uruven, LLC, 348 So. 3d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). An express tenancy-by-the-entireties designation on a bank signature card establishes the account as entireties property and ends the inquiry; no showing of the common-law unities is required. The court rested on Beal Bank, with § 655.79(1) as a second reason. It affirmed garnishment of two accounts the debtor held jointly with people other than his spouse. The Florida Supreme Court approved the decision in Loumpos to the extent consistent with its opinion.

Loumpos v. Bank One, 392 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). The Second District held that neither Beal Bank nor § 655.79(1) eliminated the common-law unities, even where the signature card expressly designates entireties, and certified conflict with Versace; the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision on December 11, 2025.

First National Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971). The source of the older rule that intent to hold personal property as entireties had to be proven unless the instrument expressly said so; Beal Bank receded from it while agreeing that an express entireties designation ends the inquiry.

The § 655.79(1) entireties presumption is a default, defeated only by a writing that specifies otherwise. The section’s first sentence is a survivorship presumption for any deposit account in two or more names, and subsection (2)’s rebuttal standard, “fraud or undue influence or clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent,” is written around vesting at death. The entireties sentence, a 2008 addition unamended since, reads: “any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing.”

Defeating the Entireties Presumption

A writing defeats the entireties presumption for a spousal bank account only if it expressly disclaims tenancy by the entireties. The disclaimer may appear in any writing tied to the account, including the bank’s standard customer agreement rather than the signature card.

Storey Mountain, LLC v. George, 357 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). An entireties disclaimer under § 655.79(1) may appear in any “writing,” including a written integrated document incorporated by reference into a signature card. The couple’s card said nothing about ownership form; the bank’s standard checking account agreement said a spousal account “is NOT owned as tenants by the entireties unless otherwise expressly designated on the Account records,” and that clause controlled. The account was garnishable for the husband’s individual judgment debt, and the Fourth District reversed the order dissolving the writ.

Storey Mountain, LLC v. Del Amo (In re Del Amo), 158 F.4th 1335 (11th Cir. 2025). Leading case. The 2008 amendment did not abrogate Beal Bank‘s express-disclaimer requirement; it changed only where the disclaimer may appear. The court read George as keeping that requirement in force and holding only that a writing other than a signature card can satisfy it. A card stating that “Joint accounts are owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship” did not defeat the presumption, because “[i]t is not enough to say the account is something else.”

Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates, 780 So. 2d 45, 60 (Fla. 2001). An express disclaimer is either a signed statement that entireties ownership was not intended, paired with an express designation of another form, or a joint-tenancy or tenancy-in-common election on a card that offered entireties as a choice. Calling a husband-and-wife account a joint tenancy with right of survivorship on the card does not suffice. Where the institution did not offer entireties or expressly precluded it, no presumption arises and the debtor must prove entireties intent by a preponderance.

Regions Bank v. Hyman, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1234 (M.D. Fla. 2015). A signature card offered a multiple-party account held as tenancy by the entireties among its options, and the debtor, a guarantor, instead initialed a multiple-party account with right of survivorship. That choice was an express disclaimer under Beal Bank. No presumption arose, the account was a joint tenancy, and the garnishment writs stood.

What the account paperwork says	Entireties?	Authority
The signature card designates tenancy by the entireties	Yes, and the inquiry ends	Beal Bank (Fla. 2001); Versace (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)
The card is silent and both spouses are named	Yes, by statutory presumption	§ 655.79(1); Beal Bank (Fla. 2001)
The account was opened by one spouse alone and is now in both spouses’ names	Yes	Loumpos (Fla. 2025)
The card or agreement says only “joint tenants with right of survivorship”	Yes, still entireties	Beal Bank (Fla. 2001); Del Amo (11th Cir. 2025)
An incorporated account agreement expressly disclaims entireties	No	Storey Mountain (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
The bank offered entireties as an option and the couple elected another form	No	Beal Bank (Fla. 2001); Hurlbert (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
The account is held jointly with someone other than the spouse	No	Versace (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)

Proceeds and How Entireties Ownership Ends

Proceeds of entireties property are themselves entireties property. Florida courts have treated sale and rental proceeds as entireties property since the 1940s (Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., Fla. 1947; Brown v. Hanger, Fla. 3d DCA 1979; Miller v. Rosenthal, Fla. 2d DCA 1987). The entireties ownership ends only by divorce, one spouse’s death, or the spouses’ agreement.

Passalino v. Protective Group Securities, Inc., 886 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Leading case. Sale proceeds of entireties property keep their entireties character, and depositing them in the couple’s attorney’s trust account did not destroy the unities, because both spouses kept beneficial ownership and control. The spouses’ agreement ending the entireties ownership may be inferred from conduct; without one, neither spouse alone can alter the entireties ownership of property so held. Applying Beal Bank, the court held that one spouse’s permitted withdrawals do not show the account was not entireties property.

Snyder v. Dinardo, 700 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). An escrow agreement between the spouses and their attorney over entireties sale proceeds established the intent to create a tenancy by the entireties, even though the escrow agent alone had signatory authority.

Rollins v. Alvarez, 792 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). A footnote states that a transfer to a trustee “destroyed any tenancy by the entireties”; the wife there had transferred the property to a trust her husband alone controlled, and Passalino narrowed the footnote to those facts.

Grossfeld v. Security National Mortgage Co., No. 3D23-600 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 17, 2024). A mortgage on entireties property that one spouse alone signed is voidable rather than void and expresses an intent to create a lien on that spouse’s interest (Hillman v. McCutchen, 166 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)). When foreclosure of a mortgage both spouses had signed severed the unities, TD Bank’s lien under a mortgage the husband alone had signed attached to the surplus and took priority over the couple’s claim to it. The property was not homestead.

Divorce and the Death of a Spouse

A Florida divorce converts entireties property into a tenancy in common automatically, and when one spouse dies the survivor continues to hold the whole.

Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1986). Leading case. When the marriage is dissolved, entireties property “converts to a tenancy in common” under Fla. Stat. § 689.15, and each former spouse’s interest is presumed equal unless the dissolution judgment awards otherwise. Florida abolished special equity in 2008 (Fla. Stat. § 61.075). The conversion is automatic: “no judicial action is required because the law will convert that entireties tenancy to a tenancy in common as soon as the marriage is dissolved” (quoting Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1976)).

Sharp v. Hamilton, 520 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1988). Where the dissolution judgment itself awards sole title to one spouse, neither a mortgage nor a judgment lien on the other spouse’s interest attaches. The judgment “operates as a defeasance of the [other spouse’s] interest in the property as though he had predeceased his wife.”

Layne v. Layne, 74 So. 3d 161, 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). The former spouses’ interests “converted into a tenancy in common when they divorced,” so when the former husband later died his one-half passed to his estate. The court applied § 689.15, under which entireties tenants “upon dissolution of marriage, shall become tenants in common.”

Federal Tax Liens Under Craft

A federal tax lien reaches one spouse’s interest in Florida entireties property, and neither the Eleventh Circuit nor Florida’s Second District has let another creditor borrow that result.

United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). A tenant by the entirety holds “property” or “rights to property” to which a federal tax lien under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 attaches, even though state law gives neither spouse a separate interest. The husband’s rights to use the Michigan property, to exclude others, and to receive its income made his interest property the lien could reach; the Court left open whether the right of survivorship alone would qualify.

Musolino v. Sinnreich (In re Sinnreich), 391 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2004). Leading case. Florida entireties property held with a non-debtor spouse is not part of the bankruptcy estate and cannot be reached by the debtor’s creditors. Craft “gave no indication that its holding could be extended beyond a tax collection context,” 391 F.3d at 1298, and extending it would make the Bankruptcy Code’s entireties exemption superfluous.

United States v. Ryals, 480 F.3d 1101 (11th Cir. 2007). Although Florida shields entireties property from execution for one spouse’s debts, the IRS’s federal statutory powers override those state entireties rights, and dividend income on entireties property counted as the taxpayer’s “other income” for levy-exemption purposes.

Gibson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 255 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). A joint federal tax refund deposited into a spousal entireties account is entireties property that a judgment creditor of the husband alone cannot garnish. The creditor’s reliance on the IRS’s power to apportion a joint refund failed because “Wells Fargo is not the IRS and lacks the IRS’s special authority under the Internal Revenue Code.”

SEC v. Yun, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2002). The court held a securities-fraud defendant in contempt for paying nothing on a disgorgement judgment. Florida’s § 222.14 annuity exemption did not bind it, and her annuities were available for the bond. It declined the SEC’s request to extend that reasoning to the home she and her husband owned by the entireties. She could not encumber entireties property without his consent, so the court refused to force her to disgorge the home, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1283–84 & n.7.

Entireties Property in Bankruptcy

Entireties property held with a non-filing spouse is exempt in the debtor’s bankruptcy, and only a joint creditor can defeat the exemption. Florida’s bankruptcy courts are divided over what makes a creditor joint and who is paid once the exemption fails.

Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3)(B) exempts a debtor’s entireties interest “to the extent that such interest … is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law,” so the exemption tracks Florida’s joint-creditor rule. Section 522(o) reduces a § 522(b)(3)(A) exemption where the debtor disposed of property within ten years intending to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, but does not reach an entireties exemption (In re Davis, Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). Section 522(q) caps § 522(p)(1) homestead-type property for a debtor electing under § 522(b)(3)(A), leaving entireties property untouched and preserving amounts reasonably necessary for support.

When a Joint Creditor Defeats the Exemption

Florida bankruptcy courts are divided over whether the trustee needs a joint creditor who can actually levy, meaning one holding a judgment against both spouses, or whether a theoretical ability to levy is enough to open entireties property to the estate.

Actual Ability to Levy Required

In re Collins, 600 B.R. 108 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2019). Unless a joint creditor in the case has the actual ability to levy, entireties property stays exempt under § 522(b)(3)(B); a merely theoretical ability is not enough. After trial the court overruled the trustee’s objection and turnover motion, adhered to Himmelstein, and expressly declined to follow Monzon.

Theoretical Ability Is Enough

In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997). The theoretical availability of prejudgment remedies is enough; a joint creditor need not already be able to levy.

No Florida appellate court or Eleventh Circuit decision resolves the split. For planning, the question is whether a jointly signed credit card or a joint guaranty is enough to open entireties property to a trustee, or whether the creditor must first hold a joint judgment. The answer depends on which line the court follows.

Who Is Paid Once the Exemption Fails

Once a joint creditor defeats the exemption, Florida bankruptcy courts are divided over whether the whole asset falls into the estate for every creditor or whether the joint creditors are paid and the rest stays exempt.

The Whole Asset Falls into the General Estate

In re Planas, 199 B.R. 211 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). Where a joint creditor who could have levied under Florida law existed when the petition was filed, the trustee may reach the entireties property, using § 522(b)(3)(B) and § 363(h) to reach the non-filing spouse’s interest. Applying Moore v. Bay through § 544(b), the court held that the proceeds go to the general estate and all creditors share them, not the joint creditors alone. The ruling was reversed in part on appeal, Planas v. Feltman, 1998 WL 757988 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1998), and In re Romagnoli, 631 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021), declined to follow Planas on distribution.

Joint Creditors Are Paid and the Excess Stays Exempt

Pepenella v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia (In re Pepenella), 103 B.R. 299 (M.D. Fla. 1988). The district court held that a debtor whose entireties property faces a joint creditor loses the exemption only to the extent of the joint creditors’ claims. The equity may satisfy the joint creditors, and the remainder stays exempt as to either spouse’s sole creditors, the rule it took from Sumy v. Schlossberg (4th Cir. 1985). It reversed the bankruptcy court, which had disallowed the exemption on four parcels because a single joint creditor existed, 103 B.R. at 301–02.

Grant v. Himmelstein (In re Himmelstein), 203 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996). A joint in personam judgment against both spouses is required before a trustee may administer entireties property when only one spouse files, and proceeds beyond the joint creditors’ claims remain exempt, a rule Collins reaffirmed.

Planas v. Feltman (In re Planas), 1998 WL 757988 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1998). Reversing the bankruptcy court on this point, the district court held that only joint creditors can be satisfied from entireties property, so the warehouse could not be liquidated for the debtor’s individual creditors. A joint creditor does not destroy the exemption; the exemption is simply not applicable to that creditor. Reading § 726 to give individual creditors access would create new state-law rights contrary to Butner, and § 522(b)(2)(B) mandates strict adherence to Florida law.

In re Romagnoli, 631 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021). Only enough entireties property to pay the joint creditors may be liquidated, and the balance stays exempt, so a joint IRS debt did not reach the debtor’s other entireties assets. The court declined the trustee’s invitation to disregard the district court’s reversal in Planas v. Feltman. It called the joint-creditors-only rule the position taken by most bankruptcy judges in the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida. Every objection to the debtor’s exemptions was overruled, and he won summary judgment.

On the first line a small joint debt can expose a whole entireties account; on the second the joint creditor is paid and the balance stays exempt.

Joint Tax Refunds as Entireties Property

Florida’s bankruptcy courts have split over whether a married couple’s joint federal income tax refund is exempt entireties property when only one spouse files for bankruptcy, with decisions on both sides in the Middle District alone.

The Refund Is Presumed Entireties Property

Dillworth v. Hinton (In re Hinton), 378 B.R. 371 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007). Joint refund checks totaling $483,292, deposited in the couple’s entireties account before the husband’s Chapter 7 filing, were exempt under § 522(b)(3)(B); the couple had no joint creditors beyond a small IRS debt. Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor Gordon v. United States (11th Cir. 1985), an apportionment between divorced spouses, limits a couple’s ability to own a refund by the entireties, 378 B.R. at 378–79. Section 522(o) does not reach a § 522(b)(3)(B) entireties claim, 378 B.R. at 380–81.

In re Newcomb, 483 B.R. 554 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). A married couple’s joint refund is presumed entireties property under Beal Bank, and a trustee who offers no evidence rebutting the presumption cannot compel turnover of the filing spouse’s share. The court declined to follow the Middle District’s Kant and Morine decisions, reading Sinnreich to mean that 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) and the IRS’s apportionment ruling create a narrow exception allowing only the IRS to defeat the unity of interest. Other creditors must rebut the presumption some other way, 483 B.R. at 557–59.

In re Uttermohlen, 506 B.R. 142 (M.D. Fla. 2012). Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court applied the Beal Bank presumption to a $10,668 joint refund that traced entirely to the debtor’s withholding; his wife did not work outside the home. The trustee found no joint creditors and offered nothing else to rebut it, so the refund stayed exempt. Section 6402(a) creates an exception only for the IRS, 506 B.R. at 145–48. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a per curiam order that gave no reasons, 525 F. App’x 916 (11th Cir. 2013).

In re Givans, No. 6:19-bk-01928-KSJ (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 17, 2021). The couple’s $11,677 and $10,392.76 refunds, claimed on joint returns filed after the husband’s Chapter 7 petition, were exempt entireties property. The trustee had to turn over the $2,390.33 portion of the 2019 refund she was holding. Reaffirming Hinton, the court rejected the arguments that the refunds came solely from the husband’s wages and that the wife’s deposit of one refund into her personal account defeated entireties status. The trustee alleged no joint creditors and offered no writing showing another form of ownership.

Each Spouse Owns a Separate Share of the Refund

In re Ascuntar, 487 B.R. 319 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013). Because federal tax law gives each spouse a separate interest in a joint refund, a refund not yet received when the petition is filed lacks the unity of interest and cannot be claimed as entireties property. The court followed Kant and Morine, distinguished Hinton because that refund had been deposited in an entireties account before the petition, and read Sinnreich as beside the point. The debtor’s 57.6% share, measured by his withholding, came into the estate, 487 B.R. at 321–24.

Absent a joint creditor, a refund deposited in an entireties account before the petition is exempt under both lines. A refund still expected on the petition date stays exempt under Newcomb, Uttermohlen, and Givans but is split by each spouse’s withholding under Ascuntar.

Transfers Into Entireties Form

Moving property into entireties form is not by itself a fraudulent transfer. The conversion is still avoidable where joint creditors could reach the property or the conversion itself was fraudulent.

Under § 726.102(2)(c), Florida Statutes, an entireties interest is not an “asset” where a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant could not reach it, so a transfer of protected entireties property is generally not a fraudulent transfer at all. Beal Bank itself said that concerns about fraud on creditors “are more properly addressed by those statutes that prevent fraudulent transfers,” a line the Fourth District repeated in Versace.

Ellis Sarasota Bank & Trust Co. v. Nevins, 409 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Leading case. Depositing wages into an entireties account “may, but will not necessarily, constitute a fraudulent transfer,” and the wages can be reached only when the transfer is “clothed with fraud,” the Second District held. Relevant factors are the account’s age and purpose, whether a previous entireties account existed, and whether all funds came from one source. A plaintiff must also “join both tenants in the proceedings” before an entireties account can answer for one tenant’s individual judgment debt.

United States v. Major, 551 B.R. 531 (M.D. Fla. 2016). Deeding a solely owned property into entireties form while owing the IRS eliminated all equity in the debtor’s name alone and left him insolvent, so the government won summary judgment avoiding the transfer under Fla. Stat. §§ 726.106(1) and 726.108(1)(a). “Marital consideration” and “love and affection” are not reasonably equivalent value.

Meininger v. Miller (In re Miller), 188 B.R. 302 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). Converting severable tenancy-in-common fractional interests in six properties into entireties form left the debtor owning nothing individually. The court avoided the transfers after trial under § 726.105(1)(a), for actual intent, and under § 726.106(1), because the fractional interests could have satisfied the noteholders and the entireties interests could not.

Dzikowski v. Delson (In re Delson), 247 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). A transfer of entireties property is generally not avoidable, because § 726.102(2)(c) excludes entireties interests from “asset,” but there are two gateways: the transfer into entireties status was itself fraudulent, or joint creditors then existed who could have reached the property. The court denied both sides’ motions for summary judgment and set the case for trial.

Ming Properties, Inc. v. Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Section 726.102(2)(c)’s qualifier “would permit a creditor … to prove that the entireties property was obtained with fraudulently acquired funds.” The burden is on the creditor, and the summary judgment was reversed.

Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 561 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016). One of three Morgan Stanley accounts had no entireties option and no express disclaimer; with no joint creditors, the presumption applied and the transfers stood. The second account’s agreement said “joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common”; it stayed entireties property, because a survivorship statement is not a disclaimer. The third offered a “Tenants by the Entirety” option and the couple chose survivorship joint tenancy: an express disclaimer, no presumption, and only the debtor’s half exposed.

Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). For a creditor not in existence when the transfer was made, actual fraudulent intent must be proved; the trial court’s distinction between “possible” and “probable” future creditors is not the relevant inquiry.

Creating a Tenancy by the Entireties in Real Property

Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939). An equally divided Florida Supreme Court affirmed a decree sustaining a deed by which a husband conveyed land directly to himself and his wife as tenants by the entireties. Three justices reasoned the five unities were met and three concluded the deed failed for want of unity of time and title. The Legislature settled the question by statute. Section 689.11 now lets the titled spouse create entireties ownership by a single deed to the other spouse stating that purpose, or to both spouses.

Clampitt v. Wick, 320 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). A husband deeded four properties from his sole name into his and his wife’s names. That created tenancies by the entireties under § 689.11(1)(b), and a trial court that found the unity of time missing was reversed. The statute did away with the straw-person conveyance the common law required, so the couple’s interests need not have begun at the same moment. The creditor had attacked the transfers in proceedings supplementary after a $4.1 million judgment.

Securities, Vehicles, and Other Personal Property

Florida’s entireties presumption reaches personal property generally, including a stock certificate titled to both spouses, but a vehicle title reading “or” and an express election of another ownership form both override it.

Section 655.79 governs deposit accounts at financial institutions; no decision has extended it to brokerage accounts, and the securities decisions instead apply Beal Bank‘s common-law presumption for personal property. A vehicle is entireties property only if the title joins the spouses’ names with “and,” because under § 319.22(2)(a) a title reading “or” creates a joint tenancy.

Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Leading case. A stock certificate issued to husband and wife without designating the form of interest may be found to be entireties property. Where the issuer’s forms offered entireties, tenancy in common, or joint tenancy with right of survivorship and the couple chose joint tenancy, intent was self-evident and no parol evidence was needed. Those securities were reachable for his individual debt while he lived; once he died, survivorship vested in the widow and the judgment lien on his half was no longer viable.

Cacciatore v. Fisherman’s Wharf Realty Ltd. Partnership, 821 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Beal Bank‘s rationale reaches personal property generally, so where a creditor of one spouse levies on a stock certificate titled to both spouses and the unities exist, the entireties presumption arises and the burden shifts to the creditor. The words “with right of survivorship” are not required, because survivorship is “the very essence” of entireties ownership; the levy order was reversed.

In re Luna, 100 B.R. 605 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). Years of marriage, continuous possession, and testimony that the goods would pass to the surviving spouse rather than the donor create a presumption that a couple intended to hold personal property by the entireties. The court declined to follow In re Marchini, 45 B.R. 187 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984), and let the debtor exempt furniture received as a 1978 wedding gift. The Florida Supreme Court quoted the passage in Beal Bank.

In re Howe, 241 B.R. 242 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). Before Beal Bank, Florida law presumed against entireties ownership of personal property, so a debtor claiming the exemption had to prove that the spouses acquired the property intending entireties ownership. That proof had to include “a quantum of documentary evidence”; testimony alone was insufficient. Six furniture receipts made out to one spouse, the other, or both showed no such intent, and the debtor lost the exemption for $4,096 of household goods. Beal Bank receded from that requirement fifteen months later.

Xayavong v. Sunny Gifts, Inc., 891 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). A car titled to one spouse “or” the other is a joint tenancy under § 319.22(2)(a) “even if the coowners are husband and wife,” so the husband’s half was leviable. Beal Bank‘s presumption “only appears to apply when an uncertainty or ambiguity exists in the quality of the title,” and the titling statute controlled.

AmSouth Bank of Florida v. Hepner, 647 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Extrinsic evidence cannot establish entireties ownership against an “or” vehicle title, so the bank could reach the husband’s half; the denial of its motion for levy was reversed.

In re Daniels, 309 B.R. 54 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004). The Beal Bank presumption extends to marital personal property generally but yields to a controlling titling statute. Under § 319.22 the conjunction “or” on a certificate of title creates a joint tenancy, not entireties, and the trustee’s objection was sustained in part.

In re Caliri, 347 B.R. 788 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006). Jet skis titled “Philip R Caliri Jr OR Elizabeth A Caliri” were a joint tenancy under the vessel titling statute, but the couple’s federally documented catamaran fell outside Florida’s titling law, so the Beal Bank presumption applied and the boat was exempt entireties property. Accounts the couple opened before their marriage failed the unity of marriage and were not entireties property.

Joint Account Survivorship at Death

If one owner of a Florida deposit account in two or more names dies, the survivor is presumed to take the balance unless the estate proves fraud or undue influence, or proves a contrary intent by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 655.80 defines a convenience account as a deposit account, other than a certificate of deposit, held in one individual’s name as principal, with others designated as agents who may deposit and withdraw funds. All rights in the account belong to the principal alone, and only the principal may add or remove agents or change the account’s terms. The agent’s authority is not an ownership interest, which separates a convenience account from a joint tenancy.

Pre-statute joint-account decisions. Before the 1969 savings-and-loan statute and the 1971 banking statute, a survivor’s claim to a joint account the other owner had funded rested on common-law joint-tenancy and gift theory. A gift was presumed once the account was opened with one owner’s money, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence, and delivery and surrender of dominion were not required because each owner could withdraw. Representative: Maier v. Bean, 189 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Section 658.56 replaced that gift analysis with a contract theory (Combee, 1992).

How the Presumption Attaches

Florida’s district courts are divided over whether a deposit account in two or more names carries the survivorship presumption on the names alone or only where the account documents refer to survivorship.

The Names Alone Raise the Presumption

In re Estate of Herring, 670 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Section 655.79(1) requires no explicit words of survivorship. The presumption attaches whenever two or more people are listed as owners unless expressly negated in the instrument or by extrinsic proof. A certificate titled “Herbert H. Herring or Robert J. Herring” carried it, and the estate offered nothing in rebuttal. Because the statute covers maintaining an account, it also governed a certificate created before its 1992 effective date and kept in force by automatic renewal.

Rosecrans v. Eden, 538 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). “The presumption of survivorship must be expressly negated, not expressly invoked,” the Fifth District held, recognizing conflict with Harrison. The documents opening a joint money-market checking account raised the presumption under § 658.56 without any survivorship words, because the depositor had signed a signature card incorporating the bank’s deposit agreement, and the estate produced no clear and convincing rebuttal. Section 689.15’s express-survivorship requirement does not control where the more specific banking statute applies.

Survivorship Language Is Required

Harrison v. Huber, 463 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review dismissed, 469 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1985). Some language indicating survivorship is required before the statutory presumption arises. A certificate of deposit titled “James R. Leathers or Frank H. Harrison,” with no reference to survivorship, therefore created no survivorship account. The court construed § 659.291(1), Florida Statutes (1979), later renumbered § 658.56.

In re Estate of Clement, 568 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The decedent’s accounts passed to his widow, but five certificates of deposit went to the estate. The only proof that they were survivorship accounts was a document he alone signed, reading “or Gladys Clement” and saying nothing about survivorship. The Second District expressly adhered to Harrison after the Fifth District’s disagreement in Rosecrans.

The Florida Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict, and the Second District has not receded from Harrison. A two-name certificate lacking survivorship language therefore passes to the survivor or to the estate depending on the district.

Brown v. Brown, 149 So. 3d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Section 655.79 reaches only “a deposit account in the names of two or more persons,” so it does not govern pay-on-death accounts, which fall under § 655.82 and carry no rebuttable presumption. When the last party dies, the balance belongs to the surviving beneficiary, with no presumption to rebut. Applying § 655.79 to three pay-on-death certificates was error; on the two genuinely joint certificates, the evidence supported the finding that the estate’s curator had overcome the presumption.

Rebutting the Presumption

Florida’s joint-account survivorship presumption can always be rebutted by clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent, and the estate may prove that intent with parol evidence even where the account documents are unambiguous.

In re Estate of Combee, 601 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1992). Leading case. Section 658.56 resolves joint-account disputes on a contract theory rather than gift theory. The statute presumes that the survivors take whatever remains at death, so donative intent, delivery, dominion, and acceptance are beside the point. The presumption shifts the burden to the estate at the clear and convincing level, and the estate may rebut with parol evidence. The Court disapproved In re Estate of Gainer (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) insofar as it rested on the lack of a completed lifetime gift.

Larkins v. Mendez, 363 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). Checking the signature card’s “multiple-party account with right of survivorship” box and leaving the convenience-account box blank does not create an irrebuttable presumption. Section 655.79 makes the presumption rebuttable by clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent, so the probate court’s inquiry was not confined to the card, and parol evidence supporting a convenience account was properly admitted. Because the Legislature has defined the ownership presumptions for accounts in two or more names, applying a common-law unities-of-title analysis was error, harmless there.

Pascalides v. Artico, No. 3D24-1052 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 31, 2025). A $2.3 million account titled “Theodoros Pascalides and/or Gabriela Artico,” updated in 2004 to designate the two as joint tenants with right of survivorship, was not a convenience account. A convenience account under § 655.80(1) stands in one individual’s name with others as agents, whereas joint tenants own equal undivided interests, so the survivorship designation defeated the estate’s theory. Neither the gift presumed where one person funds a joint account nor § 655.79(1)’s survivorship presumption was rebutted, and the survivor took the funds.

Caputo v. Nouskhajian, 871 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Parol evidence of contrary intent is admissible even where the account documents unambiguously create survivorship rights, because § 655.79 applies to unambiguous documents by its terms and Combee lets the estate offer such proof. Where the funds had originated in the decedent’s brother’s account, his intent was spent once his estate was distributed, and the decedent’s own intent then controlled.

Mulato v. Mulato, 705 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The presumed gift reaches only the funds still in the account when the depositor dies, and a joint holder who never deposited, withdrew, or exercised any control over an account opened with another’s money has no present interest in it. The daughter therefore took everything in the survivorship accounts she held with her mother, even though her brother had originally been on title to several, because he never overcame the presumption.

King v. Estate of King, 554 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Signature cards showing joint and several accounts in the decedent’s name or his son’s, with the notation “adding son’s name to account,” were ambiguous enough to admit parol evidence. That evidence showed clearly and convincingly that the father wanted a signing convenience only, so the accounts stayed in the estate. The statute independently authorizes such proof whatever the parol evidence rule would otherwise do.

Freedman v. Freedman, 345 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). A joint certificate of deposit passed to the surviving son under the predecessor statute. There was no undue influence and no clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent. The son’s own belief that title would not be his until his father died did not defeat the gift. The court reversed as to $50,000 of jointly registered stock, which the statute did not reach, because the father kept control and took all the dividends.

Fraud and Undue Influence

A survivor who had a confidential relationship with the depositor and actively procured the joint account must first rebut a presumption of undue influence before relying on the statutory survivorship presumption.

Meth v. Sparaga, 406 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The survivor had a close relationship with the hospitalized, 92-year-old depositor and actively procured the joint accounts in the two weeks before the depositor died, which raised a presumption of undue influence. He had to rebut that presumption before he could rely on the statutory vesting presumption, and because undue influence presents fact questions, the summary judgment in his favor was reversed.

Seidl v. Estate of Michelsen, 487 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). An ill depositor whom a visiting nephew persuaded to retitle her accounts as survivorship joint tenancies never intended to transfer a present interest. Her demand that the transfers be undone, and her suit to rescind them before she died, were clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent under the bank statute. The savings-and-loan statute’s conclusive presumption did not apply, because the depositor herself had sued while living.

Briscoe v. Florida National Bank of Miami, 394 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). A confidential relationship plus active procurement of the joint account made out a prima facie case of undue influence. The bank’s reasonable explanation dispelled the presumption, however, and left the question for the jury, so directing a verdict against the survivor was error. Excluding the survivor’s own testimony under the deadman’s statute was also error, because introducing the depositor’s authorization letter and the signature card had waived it.

The steps for opening an account that these decisions will treat as entireties property, and the titling and agreement errors that forfeit the presumption, are on the how to open a tenancy by the entirety bank account and common mistakes pages.